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Judges’ Misuse of Contempt in Criminal Cases and
Limits of Advocacy
Peter A. Joy*
“Use of the contempt power threatens attorneys’ individual rights and
security, especially when contempt charges are tried summarily. More
importantly, the exercise of the contempt power, and even the potential for
its exercise, can have a serious chilling effect on the vigor of advocacy.
Indeed, the greatest danger of this kind of Sword of Damocles ‘is that it
hangs—not that it drops.’”1
“The arguments of a lawyer in presenting his client’s case strenuously
and persistently cannot amount to a contempt of court so long as the lawyer
does not in some way create an obstruction which blocks the judge in the
performance of his judicial duty.”2
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I. BACKGROUND FOR THE CHICAGO EIGHT TRIAL ........................ 912
II. JUDGES’ MISUSING THEIR CONTEMPT POWER ......................... 917
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* Henry Hitchcock Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. The
inspiration for this Article came from a memorable lecture by Leonard Wineglass that I heard while
I was in law school, which I discuss in the Conclusion. He explained how to advocate for a client
zealously without being held in contempt of court, and his presentation was based in large part on
his experience as defense counsel in the Chicago Eight Trial. I thank the members of the
Southeastern Association of American Law Schools (SEALS) participants on “Judging: Fifty Years
After the Chicago 7 Trial” for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial
Contempt Power—Part One: The Conflict Between Advocacy and Contempt, 65 WASH. L. REV.
477, 48182 (1990). Louis Raveson’s quote about the Sword of Damocles comes from a dissent
by Justice Douglas discussing the chilling effect of a statute that limits a public employee’s speech
that is overbroad or vague. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 23031 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas described the danger of such restrictions on speech:
The dismissal standard hangs over their heads like a sword of Damocles, threatening
them with dismissal for any speech that might impair the “efficiency of the service.”
That this Court will ultimately vindicate an employee if his speech is constitutionally
protected is of little consequence—for the value of a sword of Damocles is that it
hangs—not that it drops. For every employee who risks his job by testing the limits of
the statute, many more will choose the cautious path and not speak at all.
Id. at 231.
2. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962).
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INTRODUCTION
It is critical for judges and criminal defense lawyers to understand the
limits of a judge’s contempt authority and the line between a lawyer’s
effective advocacy on behalf of a client and contempt of court. The judge
is charged with maintaining order in the court,3 but the judge must also
respect, and should protect, the accused’s right to receive the effective
assistance of counsel.4 At the same time, the defense lawyer is an
advocate responsible for ensuring the due process rights of the accused,5
but, as an officer of the court, “shall not . . . engage in conduct intended
to disrupt a tribunal.”6 Judges and defense lawyers need to balance their

3. “Courts must have the power to enforce order and to compel compliance with their authority.
Orderly proceedings and obedience to the courts’ commands are essential to the proper
administration of justice.” Raveson, supra note 1, at 482.
4. “In criminal cases, a judge’s duty to do justice must include ensuring that the accused has a
meaningful Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, because effective legal
representation is essential to a fair trial.” Peter A. Joy, A Judge’s Duty to Do Justice: Ensuring the
Accused’s Right to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 139, 140 (2017). See
also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (“[J]udges should strive to maintain proper
standards of performance by attorneys who are representing defendants in criminal cases in their
courts.”).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (“Without counsel, the right to a
trial itself would be ‘of little avail’ . . . .”); Joy, supra note 4, at 155 (“The right to the effective
assistance of counsel is the cornerstone of a fair and just criminal trial or plea, and necessary for
the accused to receive due process.”).
6. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).

2019]

Judges’ Misuse of Contempt

909

respective obligations for the criminal justice system to operate
effectively. Rather than achieving balance, these obligations clashed in
the Chicago Eight Trial, which became known as the Chicago Seven Trial
after Judge Julius Hoffman declared a mistrial for the eighth defendant,
Bobby Seale, and severed Seale’s case for a separate trial.7
A week before declaring the mistrial, though, Judge Hoffman had
Seale bound and gagged after Seale persisted in asserting his Sixth
Amendment right to have his counsel of choice present or to proceed pro
se.8 After declaring the mistrial, Judge Hoffman summarily convicted
and sentenced Seale on sixteen counts of contempt.9 As explained later
in this Article, Judge Hoffman also extensively interfered with the due
process and effective assistance of counsel rights of the remaining seven
defendants, and Judge Hoffman made more than 150 contempt findings
against the remaining seven defendants and their two lawyers. 10
The federal statute upon which Judge Hoffman exercised his contempt
power required four elements.11 First, the conduct must be
“misbehavior,” which the court defined as inappropriate for the role of a
party or counsel.12 Second, the misbehavior must “rise to the level of an
‘obstruct[ion of] the administration of justice.’”13 Third, the misbehavior
7. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 350 (7th Cir. 1972). Once Judge Hoffman severed Seal
from the trial, the trial generally became known as the Chicago Seven Trial.
8. Id. at 35051. Judge Hoffman had denied the request of Charles Garry, Seale’s lawyer, for a
trial continuance due to Garry’s gall bladder operation. Id. at 349. Seale renewed the request for a
continuance until Garry could represent him prior to the start of evidence, and Judge Hoffman
denied the request. Seale made it clear to Judge Hoffman that he was not represented by William
Kunstler, and, if he could not be represented by Garry, Seale wanted to represent himself. Judge
Hoffman would not permit Seale to proceed pro se. Id. at 35051. The right of a defendant to refuse
counsel and to represent him- or herself was later recognized by the United States Supreme Court
in 1975, six years after Judge Hoffman denied Seale this right. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 852 (1975).
9. Seale, 461 F.2d at 35051. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Judge Hoffman’s
contempt findings against Seale and remanded them for trial before a new judge. See infra notes
5355 and accompanying text. The government ultimately abandoned the contempt charges. Infra
notes 5355 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 1733.
11. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cited to 18 U.S.C. § 401 in Seale, 461 F.2d at 366,
which provides:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both,
at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
18 U.S.C § 401 (2012).
12. Seale, 461 F.2d at 366.
13. Id. at 367 (brackets in original) (quoting In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 234 (1962)).
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“must be in the court’s presence or so proximate that it obstructs the
administration of justice.”14 And, fourth, there must be intent to obstruct
the administration of justice,15 which the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.16
While Judge Hoffman wielded his judicial contempt power in an
unrestrained fashion, as would later be determined by subsequent court
proceedings,17 throughout the trial he was also condescending, belittling,
and insulting to defense counsel, William Kunstler and Leonard
Weinglass. There are too many instances to recount here, but some
examples of Judge Hoffman’s tone and attitude, and his attempts to
undermine the defense, are instructive.
Judge Hoffman repeatedly stated or implied that defense counsel were
not truthful by making comments such as the following:
“Your representations to the Court don’t mean very much.” “That is a
falsehood.” “When you begin to keep your word around here . . .” “I
wouldn’t take your assurances because you have violated it on so many
occasions.” “That is a falsehood . . . and I shall deal appropriately with
it.” . . . . He told counsel “Your credit isn’t very good.” Whenever the
prosecutors accused defense counsel of misrepresenting the record or
making misstatements, the judge refused the request of defense counsel
that the record be read, to disprove the charge. Even when defense
counsel had the transcript before them and were able to disprove
prosecution charges that misstatements were made, the judge refused to
admonish the prosecutors.18

Another theme was Judge Hoffman repeatedly referring to defense
counsel as not being from Illinois, in an apparent attempt to cast them as
outsiders before the jury.19 He made statements such as:
“I don’t need someone to come here from New York . . . to tell me that
there is a constitution.” “You are only a temporary officer of this
Court.” The judge referred to “Newark” (residence of defense counsel
Weinglass). “You are thinking of Newark, Mr. Weinglass. You don’t
practice here regularly.” . . . . The court referred to “where you come
from, Mr. Kunstler.” [To which counsel replied: “are you going to add
that now? In the eyes of the jury I am a foreigner . . .”]. . . . . Defense
witnesses too were treated with derision. For example, Cora Weiss was
referred to as “this lady from the Bronx.”20
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 36768.
17. See id. at 350; In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 403 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dellinger,
472 F.2d 340, 386 (7th Cir. 1972).
18. Brief of Appellants at 48 n.56, In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972) (No. 18294)
(citations omitted).
19. Id. at 44 n.50.
20. Id. (citations omitted).
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Judge Hoffman also referred to defense counsel in other derogatory
and demeaning ways, again most likely to undermine their credibility
with the jury. Here are a few examples of the many ways Judge Hoffman
belittled Kunstler and Weinglass:
The judge accused defense counsel of “play(ing) horse” with the Court.
He referred to counsel as a “TV actor” and the defendants as “your
clan.” He called counsel a “phrasemaker,” “unprofessional”. . . .
....
He indicated a total lack of respect for counsel by the way he
distorted and forgot their names. He called Mr. Weinglass: “Feinglass”;
“Feinstein, Weinstein”; “Fein-Weinstein”; “Weinstein”; “Weinrob”;
“Weinwrass” . . . . He called Mr. Kunstler “Charles” Kunstler and forgot
his name.21

In reviewing Judge Hoffman’s actions throughout the Chicago Eight
Trial on appeal, the Seventh Circuit stated: “The district judge’s
deprecatory and often antagonistic attitude toward the defense is evident
in the record from the very beginning. It appears in remarks and actions
both in the presence and absence of the jury.” 22 The court of appeals
stated that Judge Hoffman’s remarks in the presence of the jury were
“deprecatory of defense counsel and their case,” and his “comments were
often touched with sarcasm, implying rather than saying outright that
defense counsel was inept, bumptious, or untrustworthy, or that his case
lacked merit.”23 The court of appeals further found that “cumulatively,
[Judge Hoffman’s remarks] must have telegraphed to the jury the judge’s
contempt for the defense.”24
To be sure, defense counsel also engaged in conduct that the court of
appeals found unacceptable. The Court noted that both Kunstler and
Weinglass insulted Judge Hoffman, especially by questioning his honesty
and integrity.25 For example, Kunstler stated that Judge Hoffman
“violated every principle of fair play” by excluding a witness for the
defense, that “this is not a fair trial,” and “there is no law in this court.”26
Weinglass “referred to the trial judge as ‘inhumane,’ called the judge’s
action ‘disgraceful,’ and possibly accused the judge of ‘dishonesty.’” 27
In appealing their contempt convictions, Kunstler and Weinglass
argued that their conduct responded to Judge Hoffman’s treatment of
them and Judge Hoffman’s claims that they were engaging in
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 4748 n.55 (citations omitted).
Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 386.
Id. at 387.
Id.
In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 396.
Id.
Id.
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unprofessional conduct.28 Addressing this argument, the court of appeals
stated, “Even if the judge’s accusation be unfounded or ill-tempered, it
does not protect counter-misbehavior . . . ‘[T]wo wrongs do not make a
right, and misconduct cannot obliterate other misconduct.’”29
Judge Hoffman’s personal contempt for the defense extended to both
the defendants and defense counsel, and he misused his judicial contempt
authority to punish them. At the conclusion of the trial, while the jury was
deliberating, Judge Hoffman summarily convicted the defendants and
their trial counsel, Kunstler and Weinglass, of 159 specifications of
contempt of court.30 Of those contempt findings, Judge Hoffman found
Kunstler guilty of twenty-four separate instances of contempt and
sentenced him separately on each from a few days to several months to
run concurrently for a total of a four-year and thirteen-day sentence.31
Judge Hoffman found Weinglass guilty of fourteen charges of contempt
and sentenced him separately on each from a few days to several months
to run concurrently for a total of a one-year, eight-month, and five-day
sentence.32 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed all of Judge
Hoffman’s contempt findings, and only some of these contempt charges
were retried before a different judge.33
In this Article, I examine the conduct of Judge Julius Hoffman and the
defense lawyers, William Kunstler and Leonard Weinglass. I draw out
some lessons about the limits of a judge’s contempt authority against
defense lawyers in criminal matters, and how far a defense lawyer may
go in advocating for a client without being liable for contempt of court.
The balance of this Article consists of four parts. Part I discusses the
events leading up to and provides context for the Chicago Eight Trial.
Part II discusses how some judges misuse their contempt power, and
especially how they misuse it against defense lawyers in criminal cases.
Part III analyzes the basics of the law of contempt as it applied in the
Chicago Eight Trial, and as it applies in federal courts, and some state
courts, today. Part IV sets out lessons learned from the Chicago Eight
Trial about how a defense lawyer may zealously advocate for a client
without being found in contempt, and what a lawyer may not do.
I. BACKGROUND FOR THE CHICAGO EIGHT TRIAL
To understand Judge Hoffman’s use of contempt and the actions of
28. Id. at 399.
29. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Offutt, 145 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D.D.C.
1956)).
30. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
31. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 403.
32. Id. at 403.
33. See infra Part IV.B.
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Kunstler and Weinglass, one must understand some of the background
and context of the Chicago Eight Trial, which is rooted in the Vietnam
War and the student protest movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
In the fall of 1967, the Democratic Party designated Chicago as the site
of its 1968 national convention, and members of the National
Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam began planning for
a “massive anti-war demonstration” outside of the Democratic
Convention.34
The day before the convention, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley put
12,000 members of the Chicago Police Department on twelve-hour shifts,
asked the governor to activate the National Guard, and the U.S. Army
sent 6,000 troops to face approximately 10,000 demonstrators.35 After
protestors had been denied permits to assemble and camp in city parks,
they took to the streets to protest.36 The Chicago police met protestors
and bystanders alike, including members of the media, with clubs, rifles,
and tear gas.37 “Television cameras recorded indiscriminate police
brutality while demonstrators chanted ‘The whole world is watching.’”38
At the convention, “Senator Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut
condemned the ‘Gestapo tactics on the streets of Chicago,’ while Mayor
Daley, in full view of television cameras, shouted obscenities and antiSemitic slurs.”39
After the Democratic Convention, Mayor Daley’s administration
“blam[ed] the violence on ‘outside agitators.’”40 In contrast, a
Department of Justice report found no grounds to prosecute the
demonstrators, “and Attorney General Ramsey Clark asked the U.S.
attorney in Chicago to investigate possible civil rights violations by
Chicago police.”41 A few days after the Daley administration released its
report, a federal grand jury was convened to investigate possible federal
law violations by the demonstration organizers and possible civil rights
violations by the police.42
Richard Nixon won the 1968 presidential election, and he appointed
John Mitchell as the new U.S. Attorney General, who worked with the
34. BRUCE A. RAGSDALE, THE CHICAGO SEVEN: 1960S RADICALISM IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
12 (2008), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/trials/chicago7.pdf.
35. Id. at 2.
36. JASON EPSTEIN, THE GREAT CONSPIRACY TRIAL: AN ESSAY ON LAW, LIBERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION 75 (1970).
37. Id. at 7576.
38. RAGSDALE, supra note 34, at 3.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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Chicago U.S. Attorney’s Office to draft indictments against the Chicago
Eight,43 whom the government charged with federal anti-riot violations
and conspiracy to violate the anti-riot statute.44
The trial of the Chicago Eight, including the mistrial of Bobby Seale,
lasted five months.45 After deliberating for four days, the jury acquitted
two of the remaining seven defendants of all charges, and it acquitted all
seven of the conspiracy charges.46 The jury convicted five defendants of
crossing state lines to incite a riot.47 As mentioned previously, Judge
Hoffman summarily convicted the remaining seven defendants and their
two lawyers for a total of 159 specifications of contempt.48
In the aftermath of the trial, verdicts against the Chicago Seven and the
underlying anti-riot charges against Seale were dismissed on the
government’s motion.49 The five defendants convicted of violating the
anti-rioting law had their convictions overturned on appeal,50 and the
government did not refile charges against them.51 One of the issues
leading to the reversal was the fact that Judge Hoffman communicated
with the jury during the trial without defense counsel’s knowledge,52
which was in blatant disregard of the defendants’ due process rights to a
fair trial.
Seale prevailed in his appeal of the contempt charges, which the court
of appeals remanded for trial before a new judge.53 Seale argued that
because Judge Hoffman sentenced him to three-month terms for each of
sixteen alleged acts of contempt to run consecutively, the resulting fouryear prison term was longer than 180 days, which is the length of sentence
when the right to a trial by jury attached.54 Rather than taking Seale to
trial a second time, the government dropped the contempt charges against
Seale when the new judge ordered the government to produce a log of
illegal wiretapping conducted against Seale before proceeding on the

43. Id. at 4.
44. See United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir. 1972). Congress enacted the AntiRiot Act the previous year. Federal Anti-Riot Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2102 (1970).
45. See In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 391 (7th Cir. 1972).
46. United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 348, 409 (7th Cir. 1972).
47. Id. at 348.
48. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
49. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 348 n.3.
50. Id. at 409.
51. Stephanie B. Goldberg, Lessons of the ‘60s: “We’d Do It Again,” Say the Chicago Seven’s
Lawyers, A.B.A. J., May 15, 1987, at 32, 35.
52. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 377.
53. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 356 (7th Cir. 1972).
54. See id. at 356 (“Seale contends . . . we must look to the aggregate sentence . . . and not to
each three-month sentence separately.”).
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remanded contempt charges.55
The Seventh Circuit also reversed all of Judge Hoffman’s contempt
findings against the Chicago Seven and their lawyers, and remanded for
hearing before a different judge 141 of the original 159 contempt findings
against the seven defendants, Kunstler, and Weinglass. 56 In doing so, the
appellate court dismissed as legally insufficient seven of the fourteen
contempt citations against Weinglass, nine of the twenty-four contempt
citations against Kunstler, and partially dismissed three other citations
against Kunstler.57
On remand, the government proceeded with only fifty-two of the
remaining 141 contempt citations against the Chicago Seven and their
lawyers, and the government stipulated that the maximum sentence it
would seek would be a total of 177 days against any one person in order
to avoid a jury trial.58 At the end of the government’s case, which
consisted solely of the trial transcript, the new judge, Judge Edward
Gignoux, acquitted two of the seven defendants of all of the contempt
charges and dismissed several other of the contempt charges against the
other defendants.59
At the end of the trial for the remaining five defendants, Kunstler, and
Weinglass, Judge Gignoux dismissed all of the contempt charges against
two more of the defendants and Weinglass.60 Judge Gignoux convicted
one of the defendants of seven specifications of criminal contempt,
convicted each of the two remaining defendants of two specifications of
criminal contempt, and convicted Kunstler of two specifications of
contempt.61 The judge directed that no fine or sentence of incarceration
be imposed on any of those convicted.62 While the resulting contempt
convictions partially vindicated a small portion of Judge Hoffman’s
exercise of his contempt authority, Judge Hoffman’s misuse of his
contempt authority and his injudicious handling of the trial most likely
led Judge Gignoux to drastically reduce the number of contempt findings
and to refrain from imposing any punishment on the three remaining
Chicago Seven defendants or Kunstler.63
55. Goldberg, supra note 51, at 35.
56. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1304, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
57. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400–01, 403 (7th Cir. 1972).
58. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. at 1307 n.5. A jury trial would be required if the maximum
sentence was more than 180 days (six months). In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 397.
59. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. at 1307.
60. See id. at 1323 (stating the judgments for each defendant).
61. Id. at 1323–24.
62. Id.
63. This interpretation of the resulting contempt convictions is confirmed in part by the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation of Judge Gignoux’s findings. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
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Several years after the remanded trial on the contempt charges,
documents secured through a Freedom of Information Act request and
from civil discovery in an unrelated lawsuit revealed other improprieties
on the part of Judge Hoffman and the government in the Chicago Seven
Trial.64 These documents served as the basis for a motion to vacate and
expunge the criminal contempt convictions against three Chicago Seven
defendants and Kunstler.65 The official wrongdoing included a FBI
memorandum suggesting that Judge Hoffman had ex parte conversations
with the prosecutor during the trial concerning, among other things,
possible contempt citations against the defendants.66 Prior to and during
the trial, the prosecutor requested the FBI to monitor the activities of the
defendants and to record any statements that “would be invaluable to
prove contempt actions.”67 No less than three other documents indicated
that “the Chicago Police and possibly the FBI had surreptitiously attended
and/or surveilled several meetings of the defendants and their counsel.”68
The information gathered included trial strategies and potential
arguments for appeal, and the information was shared with one of the
prosecutors in the conspiracy trial.69
The trial judge hearing the motion denied the relief requested, and the
court of appeals affirmed the district court’s order.70 The court of appeals
acknowledged that the prosecutorial and judicial misconduct were
sufficient to require reversal of the convictions in the conspiracy trial, if
any convictions had still remained.71 The court of appeals also reasoned
that Judge Gignoux had considered the prosecutorial and judicial
misconduct known at the time of the remanded contempt trial in the
“radical reductions and nullifications of the earlier sanctions in this
proceeding.”72
The balance of this Article discusses how judges misuse their contempt
power, analyzes the basics of the law of contempt as it applied in the
Chicago Eight Trial, and sets out lessons learned from the Chicago Eight
64. United States v. Dellinger, 657 F.2d 140, 141–42 (7th Cir. 1981).
65. See id. at 143 (“Defendants maintain that their contempt convictions should be vacated
because the newly discovered evidence . . . demonstrates the existence of judicial and prosecutorial
misconduct during the 1969 conspiracy trial . . . .”).
66. Id. at 142.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 146.
71. Id. at 146 n.15.
72. Id. at 146. In addition, in its decision remanding the contempt trial, the court of appeals also
stated that “judicial (or prosecutorial) provocation is to be considered by the new hearing judge in
extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of any penalty to be imposed.” In re Dellinger, 461
F.2d 389, 401 (7th Cir. 1972).

2019]

Judges’ Misuse of Contempt

917

Trial about how a defense lawyer may zealously advocate for a client
without being held in contempt. The lessons learned include both what a
lawyer may and may not do and help to define when a lawyer may cross
the line into contemptuous conduct.
II. JUDGES’ MISUSING THEIR CONTEMPT POWER
Commentators have written about judges as bullies, and in their
accounts one of the main judicial bullying weapons is the threat of
contempt directed toward criminal defense lawyers. 73 For example, Abbe
Smith describes a D.C. Superior Court judge who “threatened a young
public defender with contempt and had her shackled and put in a holding
cell for not obeying his order to sit down and be quiet.”74 The judge had
the public defender held in a cell near the courtroom for forty-five
minutes, though the judge did not follow through with filing contempt
charges.75 Her offense? The public defender did not immediately obey
the judge’s order to sit down and be quiet, but rather tried to explain that
she had to go to her next court hearing.76
In an article on the constitutional limitations of judicial contempt
power, Louis Raveson notes that there are no statistics on contempt
citations, but the existing “anecdotal data suggests that the threat and use
of contempt against [criminal defense] attorneys . . . is at an all time high
and increasing.”77 Raveson states that “[i]n Los Angeles County alone,
one public defender is held in contempt or threatened with contempt
every week.”78 Although Raveson wrote about contempt in 1990, there
is no indication that judges are using threats of contempt and contempt
more sparingly today. In a comprehensive study of appeals of contempt
cases from 1826, when the study’s author found the first case involving
contempt,79 through mid-August 2016, which was selected as the cutoff
date for the study,80 a commentator found that the number of contempt
73. See, e.g., Stephen Lubet, Bullying from the Bench, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 11, 12 (2001); Douglas
R. Richmond, Bullies on the Bench, 72 LA. L. REV. 325 (2012); Abbe Smith, Judges as Bullies, 46
HOFSTRA L. REV. 253 (2017).
74. Smith, supra note 73, at 260.
75. See Keith L. Alexander, Colleagues Back Lawyer Detained in Dispute with Judge, WASH.
POST (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/04/AR20
07090402065.html.
76. Id.
77. Raveson, supra note 1, at 48081. The anecdotal data was derived from conversations that
Raveson and students assisting him had with public defender offices in every state that had such
offices, and from conversations with lawyers throughout the country. Id. at 481 n.13.
78. Id. at 480.
79. Timothy Davis Fox, Right Back “In Facie Curiae”—A Statistical Analysis of Appellate
Affirmance Rates in Court-Initiated Attorney-Contempt Proceedings, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (2007).
80. Id. at 9.
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cases has been relatively level since the 1980s.81 A few examples
illustrate judges’ misusing their contempt power in recent years.
In 2012, a judge held a defense attorney in contempt of court after the
lawyer advised his client of his Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination when a judge asked his client if he would be able to pass a
drug test.82 The judge insisted on the defendant answering his question,
“telling the attorney ‘be quiet,’ ‘sit down’ and that [the judge] did not
‘give a rat’s tail’ whether the client was on bond or not.”83 When the
defense lawyer did not change his advice to his client, the judge held him
in contempt and sentenced him to jail, where he was incarcerated for four
hours before another judge granted an emergency stay. 84 On appeal, the
contempt finding was reversed with the court saying that the contempt
was “outside the range of principled outcomes and ‘should not stand
because the incident giving rise to it was based on such a fundamental
error and the abuse of the contempt power that it is unseemly to sanction
it.’”85
In 2016, a judge in Las Vegas held a public defender in contempt while
she was advocating on behalf of a client in a probation violation matter.86
The judge told her to “be quiet,” and when she tried to interject, he said,
“Now. Not another word.”87 She replied, “Judge, you’re,” and the judge
turned to the marshal in the courtroom and ordered the marshal to cuff
the public defender and place her in the jury box along with inmates
awaiting their hearings.88 The judge proceeded to sentence the public
81. Id. at 16. Timothy Davis Fox found that while the number of contempt cases climbed each
decade from the 1940s through the 1970s, the number of cases has been relatively stable for each
decade from the 1980s and projected through the 2000s. Id.
82. Cynthia Price, Attorney Appeals Contempt Ruling with Help from Legal Community,
LEGALNEWS (Jan. 13, 2012), http://legalnews.com/grandrapids/1172742.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Barton Deiters, Circuit Court Judge Tosses Out Contempt of Court Charges Against
Attorney, MLIVE: GRAND RAPIDS (Jan. 16, 2012), https://www.mlive.com/news/grandrapids/2012/01/circuit_court_judge_tosses_out.html. Two years later, the Michigan Supreme Court
publicly censured and suspended for thirty days without pay the judge who issued the contempt
finding against the defense lawyer. Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Is Suspended for Jailing Lawyer
Who Advised His Client to Plead the 5th, A.B.A. J. (May 2, 2013, 12:09 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_is_suspended_for_jailing_lawyer_who_advised_h
is_client_not_to_answer_. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that the judge “had a ‘failure to be
aware that the judicial system is for the benefit of the litigant and the public, not the judiciary,’”
and a “failure to avoid a controversial manner or tone in addressing counsel.” Id. Based on my
research, it is extremely rare for a judge to be punished for misuse of her contempt power.
86. David Ferrara, Las Vegas Judge Handcuffs Public Defender in Courtroom, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J. (May 23, 2016, 6:49 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/las-vegasjudge-handcuffs-public-defender-in-courtroom/.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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defender’s client without the public defender or another attorney
representing the client, and then told the marshal to uncuff the public
defender saying, “I think she’s learned a lesson.”89 A week later, the
judge filed a contempt order against the public defender, but another
judge overturned the order.90
Some judges use or threaten to use their contempt power not only in
an attempt to control how defense attorneys advocate, but also to
complicate public defenders’ efforts to cope with excessive caseloads.
Two recent cases illustrate this use of contempt.
In 2017, a judge in Ramsey County, Minnesota, held a public defender
and her supervisor in contempt after a scheduling conflict, due to the
public defender’s caseload that prevented her from being present when
the judge commanded her presence.91 The judge had notified the public
defender on a Friday that he wanted her to start a trial in his courtroom
the following Monday. When she explained that she had hearings already
scheduled for other clients that conflicted with the trial date the judge had
set, the judge told her “to make it work and to be present at a hearing in
the case Monday morning.”92 She consulted with her supervisor, who
advised her to attend to her previously scheduled client matters. When
her supervisor showed up in her place to explain the scheduling conflict,
the judge held both public defenders in contempt and ordered them both
to appear the next day.93 At the hearing on the contempt the next day, the
judge rescinded the first lawyer’s contempt and stayed the contempt
against her supervisor.94 A month later, the judge rescinded the contempt
finding against the supervisor.95
Recently in Missouri, where public defenders have been working with
excessive caseloads, some judges have threatened public defenders with
contempt of court if they refuse to take on more new cases.96 These
89. Id.
90. Matt Ferner, Public Defender Who Was Handcuffed in Court Has Contempt Order
Overturned, HUFFPOST (Aug. 2, 2016, 5:51 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/zohra-bakhtarylas-vegas_n_57a0f81ae4b0e2e15eb7a152.
91. Sarah Horner, Ramsey County Judge Held 2 Public Defenders in Contempt in Clash Over
Caseloads, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Nov. 7, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.twincities.com/
2017/11/07/ramsey-county-public-defenders-clash-with-court-system-over-caseloads/.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Chao Xiong, Contempt Finding Rescinded for Ramsey County Public Defender Who
Challenged Court, STARTRIBUNE (Dec. 14, 2017, 10:01 PM), http://www.startribune.com/
contempt-finding-rescinded-for-ramsey-county-public-defender-who-challenged-court/4642
20723/.
95. Id.
96. Lucas Geisler, Public Defenders, Judge Call for Meeting with Missouri Supreme Court,
ABC 17 (Oct. 13, 2017, 9:53 PM), https://www.abc17news.com/news/public-defenders-judge-call-
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threats came after one public defender faced ethics discipline and was
placed on probation for neglect of client matters due in large part to his
heavy caseload.97 The head of the state-wide public defender stated that
threat of contempt “puts attorneys in an untenable position—refuse the
case and go to jail, or take the case and possibly lose your ability to
work.”98 Meanwhile, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is
suing the Missouri State Public Defender System, which ranks fortyninth in the United States in terms of its funding, alleging that state public
defenders are not adequately representing their clients due to large
caseloads.99
As these examples of recent contempt cases illustrate, a trial judge may
threaten to hold, or hold, a defense lawyer in contempt of court for a
variety of alleged transgressions ranging from advocacy on behalf of a
client to scheduling issues and caseload matters. The focus of this Article,
though, is on contempt and threats of contempt when a defense lawyer is
advocating on behalf of a client. The balance of this Article will confine
itself to an analysis of the law of contempt and to identifying lessons
learned about the limits of advocacy and contempt from the Chicago
Eight Trial.
III. THE LAW OF CONTEMPT
The contempt power of a judge is an inherent power that permits a
judge to punish “individuals who defy their authority or interfere with the
administration of justice.”100 The history of the contempt power has been
traced at least as far back to English law in the twelfth century, and there
for-meeting-with-missouri-supreme-court/637645820.
97. Annika Merrilees, Missouri Supreme Court Gives Probation to Columbia Public Defender,
MISSOURIAN (Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.columbiamissourian.com/news/state_news/missourisupreme-court-gives-probation-to-columbia-public-defender/article_da19a6e4-98c7-11e7-a5536f2c15700578.html. His defense also cited to his health problems. Id.
98. Geisler, supra note 96.
99. Rachel Lippmann, ACLU Sues State of Missouri, Alleges High Caseloads in Public
Defenders’ Office Unconstitutional, ST. LOUIS PUB. RADIO (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/aclu-sues-state-missouri-alleges-high-caseloads-publicdefenders-office-unconstitutional#stream/0.
100. Raveson, supra note 1, at 485. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the inherent
contempt power of judges in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 217 (1821), when it stated: “At
common law, the power to punish contempt is incident to Courts.” In another decision, the Court
explained:
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the
judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of
justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and
invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.
Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1873).
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is some evidence that power similar to contempt is found in the writings
of the Roman Emperor Justinian.101 While contempt is an inherent power
of a judge, that power has been defined and limited through legislation
and court decisions.102
In the United States, the contempt power of a judge went essentially
unchecked until the early 1800s, and, while unrestrained, some judges
used their contempt power “to censor dissent and to command any level
of respect or decorum desired by an individual judge.”103 One
commentator surveying articles about the history of the inherent power
of contempt noted that it was “overbroad and vague, subject to abuse, and
chills legitimate advocacy.”104
In 1826, a federal judge relied on his inherent contempt power and
summarily imprisoned a lawyer for publicly criticizing one of the judge’s
opinions.105 The negative public reaction to the judge’s use of contempt
prompted Congress to start impeachment proceedings against the
judge.106 The central issue of the impeachment proceedings was
“concerns for the protection of vigorous advocates and their clients facing
an unrestrained judicial power.”107 The impeachment proceedings also
illustrated how, under the existing common law at the time, whether
contempt was committed depended primarily on the judge’s own
feelings.108 Congress narrowly acquitted the judge, but soon after enacted
a law limiting a judge’s summary contempt authority to conduct that
“obstruct[s] the administration of justice.”109
This early act of Congress limiting a federal judge’s contempt power
was later codified and amended, and it now provides, in pertinent part:
“A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or
imprisonment, or both, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority,
and none other, as— (1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so
near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice . . . .”110 This
101. Luis Kutner, Contempt Power:––The Black Robe: A Proposal for Due Process, 39 TENN.
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1971).
102. See infra notes 110–15 and accompanying text (discussing the federal statute governing
judges’ contempt power as well as subsequent case law and states’ utilization of the statute).
103. Raveson, supra note 1, at 486–87.
104. Fox, supra note 79, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
105. Raveson, supra note 1, at 487.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 488 (alteration in original); Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487, 488.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012). The law also prohibits: “(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in
their official transactions; (3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule,
decree, or command.” Id. The focus of this Article is only on contempt that allegedly obstructs the
administration of justice.
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provision, which prohibits behavior that obstructs the administration of
justice, is the provision of the contempt statute under which Judge
Hoffman originally cited Seale, the Chicago Seven defendants, and their
lawyers, Kunstler and Weinglass.111
Some state courts enacted legislation based on the federal law
restricting a state judge’s contempt power to threats or actual obstruction
of the administration of justice,112 but a majority of states have not
restricted the judiciary’s contempt power.113 In those states that have not
limited a judge’s contempt power, they have either given a judge vast
authority or defined contempt broadly.114 Raveson argues, and I agree,
that the lack of specificity in defining contempt poses constitutional
issues of overbreadth and vagueness.115
There is great variation among state laws defining contempt, and many
states do not follow the federal contempt law that Judge Hoffman relied
upon in issuing his contempt citations.116 The next section confines itself
to the lessons learned from the contempt citations against Kunstler and
Weinglass for their advocacy on behalf of the Chicago Seven, and these
lessons are applicable to federal court proceedings and to those state court
jurisdictions with analogous contempt laws or that have interpreted
contempt similarly through court decisions.
IV. HOW TO ZEALOUSLY ADVOCATE WITHOUT BEING LIABLE FOR
CONTEMPT
In deciding the contempt citations against Kunstler and Weinglass, the
appellate opinion, reversing and remanding some of the contempt
citations, combined with the trial court’s opinion on remand provide
several useful lessons for judges and defense lawyers. The starting point
for these lessons, though, is a defense lawyer’s obligation to represent
clients ethically and effectively.
A. Counsel Has the Ethical Obligation and Legal Right to Represent a
Client Zealously
Ethically, a lawyer has the obligation to “take whatever lawful and
ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause or
111. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
112. Louis S. Raveson, Advocacy and Contempt—Part Two: Charting the Boundaries of
Contempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy, 65 WASH. L. REV. 743, 748–49
(1990).
113. Id.
114. Raveson, supra note 1, at 488–89.
115. See generally Raveson, supra note 112, at 745–78.
116. Raveson, supra note 1, at 488–89.
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endeavor.”117 This ethical obligation includes “act[ing] with commitment
and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy
upon the client’s behalf.”118
The zeal with which a lawyer may advocate on behalf of a client is
bounded by the ethical obligation not to “engage in conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal.”119 “Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct
is a corollary of the advocate’s right to speak on behalf of litigants.”120 A
comment to one of the ethics rules states that “[a] lawyer may stand firm
against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge’s
default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate.”121
A lawyer will not violate the ethical prescription against disrupting a
tribunal unless the lawyer acts intentionally. States pattern their ethics
rules after the American Bar Association (ABA) Rules of Professional
Conduct, and ABA Model Rule 3.5 states: “A lawyer shall not . . . (d)
engage in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal.”122 Negligent conduct
is not sufficient, but rather there must be clear and convincing evidence
that a lawyer has intentionally acted to disrupt a tribunal before there is a
violation of Rule 3.5(d).123
Legally, a violation of the federal contempt statute, or any state
contempt law that is patterned after it, requires both an actual disruption
of a court proceeding and intent to disrupt the court proceeding.124 In
considering the contempt citations against the Chicago Seven and their
lawyers, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that “mere disrespect
or insult cannot be punished where it does not involve an actual and
material obstruction.”125 The court continued, “This is particularly true
with respect to attorneys where the ‘heat of courtroom debate’ may
prompt statements which are ill-considered and might later be
regretted.”126
With regard to intent, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that

117. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. [1] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
118. Id. (emphasis added).
119. Id. at r. 3.5 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at r. 3.5 cmt. [4].
121. Id.
122. Id. at r. 3.5 (emphasis added).
123. See, e.g., Att’y Grievance Comm’n v. Hermina, 842 A.2d 762, 769 (Md. 2004) (holding
that there must be clear and convincing evidence that an attorney was deliberate and intentional,
rather than negligent); CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 391 (Ellen J. Bennett et al. eds., 8th ed. 2015) (“There should be no
violation of [Rule 3.5] paragraph (d) unless a lawyer ‘intended’ to disrupt the proceeding.”).
124. Raveson, supra note 1, at 513 n.151; see also supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
125. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
126. Id.
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“an attorney possesses the requisite intent only if he knows or reasonably
should be aware in view of all the circumstances, especially the heat of
controversy, that he is exceeding the outermost limits of his proper role
and hindering rather than facilitating the search for truth.”127 The Seventh
Circuit previously held in Seale’s appeal that intent must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.128 Thus legal contempt has a higher standard
of proof than clear and convincing evidence necessary to prove an ethics
violation under Model Rule 3.5(d) for engaging in conduct intended to
disrupt a tribunal.129
In describing what is permitted in terms of zealous representation, the
Seventh Circuit stated: “Attorneys have a right to be persistent,
vociferous, contentious, and imposing, even to the point of appearing
obnoxious, when acting in their client’s behalf. An attorney may with
impunity take full advantage of the range of conduct that our adversary
system allows.”130 In evaluating a lawyer’s conduct for requisite intent
and actual obstruction by an attorney, the court stated that “the search for
these essential elements of the crime of contempt must be made with full
appreciation of the contentious role of trial counsel and his duty of
zealous representation of his client’s interests.”131
Judge Gignoux summarized the standard by which an attorney’s
conduct should be considered by stating: “In sum, attorneys must be
given ‘great latitude’ and ‘extreme liberality’ in the area of vigorous
advocacy, and doubts in delineating the line between vigorous advocacy
and obstruction are to be resolved in favor of advocacy.” 132 With this in
mind, the following sections describe where the court of appeals and
Judge Gignoux drew lines between advocacy and contempt.
B. Permitted Advocacy and Its Limits
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed nearly half of the
original contempt citations against Kunstler and Weinglass,133 and the
government abandoned some of the remaining contempt charges against
them.134 Judge Gignoux acquitted most of the remaining charges against
127. Id.
128. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345, 367–68 (7th Cir. 1972).
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.5(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018); see also supra
notes 12122 and accompanying text.
130. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 400.
131. Id. at 397.
132. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1316 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
133. The court of appeals dismissed seven of the fourteen contempt citations against Weinglass,
nine of the twenty-four citations against Kunstler, and portions of three more of the contempt
citations against Kunstler. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d at 400, 403.
134. The government proceeded with only 52 of 141 contempt citations remanded for trial. In
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Kunstler and Weinglass after the government’s case, and Gignoux’s
opinion discusses five remaining contempt citations against Kunstler and
one contempt citation against Weinglass.135 The lessons from both the
appellate court’s and Judge Gignoux’s decisions follow.
1. Lesson One: Persistent Argument Alone Is Not Contempt
Judge Hoffman found Weinglass in contempt after Weinglass persisted
in arguing the relevance of an intended line of questioning. 136 Judge
Hoffman had sustained the government’s objection that the testimony
would be irrelevant, and Weinglass persisted in explaining why the
testimony was relevant even after Judge Hoffman repeatedly ordered
Weinglass to continue examining the witness.137 Judge Gignoux found
that Weinglass “sincerely believed that the judge had not given him a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and did not fully understand his
position.”138 Weinglass did not insult or show disrespect for Judge
Hoffman, and he confined his remarks to argument. Judge Gignoux found
no evidence “that his statements were made in an offensive manner or in
any way disrupted the proceedings.”139 Judge Gignoux concluded that
“while Mr. Weinglass approached the brink, he did not cross the line
between advocacy and obstruction.”140
In contrast, Judge Gignoux found Kunstler’s persisting in making an
argument did constitute contempt. Judge Hoffman had denied Kunstler’s
request to call a defense witness who had unexpectedly become available
and was traveling to the court at the close of the defense case.141 Judge
Hoffman instructed Kunstler not to make any reference to the fact that
the defense wished to call this witness in the presence of the jury.142
Subsequent to this ruling, Kunstler interrupted the government’s
examination of its first rebuttal witness to announce that the defense
witness was present. In the presence of the jury, Kunstler renewed his
motion to call the defense witness, continued to argue the motion after it
had been denied, and did not sit down after Judge Hoffman repeatedly
ordered him to do so.143 Judge Gignoux found:
re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. at 1307. The trial court decision does not delineate how many contempt
charges the government pursued against Kunstler and Weinglass on remand. Id.
135. Id. at 131720.
136. Id. at 1318.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1319.
141. Id. at 1320.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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The record clearly shows that Mr. Kunstler flagrantly and defiantly
violated the court’s order not to renew his motion in the presence of the
jury and persisted in continuing argument after the judge’s repeated
directions to stop. His conduct exceeded the “outermost limits” of
vigorous advocacy and constituted contemptuous misbehavior which he
assuredly knew or reasonably should have been aware was wrongful.
His actions plainly caused a substantial delay in the proceedings and
obstructed the judge in the performance of his judicial duty.144

Judge Gignoux’s analyses of the contempt citations against Weinglass
and Kunstler are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court case In Re
McConnell,145 in which a lawyer who was trying to preserve important
issues for appeal was convicted of contempt for telling the trial judge,
“we have a right to ask the questions, and we propose to do so unless
some bailiff stops us.”146 The Court stated: “The arguments of a lawyer
in presenting his client’s case strenuously and persistently cannot amount
to a contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some way create
an obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial
duty.”147 While recognizing that it is a “necessity for a judge to have the
power to protect himself from actual obstruction in the courtroom, or
even from conduct so near to the court as actually to obstruct justice,” the
Court continued, “it is also essential to a fair administration of justice that
lawyers be able to make honest good-faith efforts to present their clients’
cases.”148 The Court summed up the rationale for a judge to take the least
restrictive approach in limiting advocacy as follows:
An independent judiciary and a vigorous, independent bar are both
indispensable parts of our system of justice. To preserve the kind of
trials that our system envisages, Congress has limited the summary
contempt power vested in courts to the least possible power adequate to
prevent actual obstruction of justice, and we think that that power did
not extend to this case.149

In reading Judge Gignoux’s reasoning as well as the Court’s decision
in In Re McConnell, a few points should be emphasized. First, a defense
lawyer who wishes to persist in an argument should have a basis to do so,
such as completing one’s argument or making a record necessary for
appeal. Second, persisting in an argument should be done professionally
and without showing disrespect for the court. Referring to the judge as
“Your Honor,” or saying something such as, “With all due respect,” as
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230 (1962).
Id. at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id.
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one persists will demonstrate respect for the court. Third, there is a limit
to how long one may persist in an argument, and a defense lawyer should
stop at the point that the argument has been completed.150
2. Lesson Two: An Invited Response Is Not Contempt
In reviewing the contempt citations and the trial record, the court of
appeals found that a number of contempt citations against Kunstler and
Weinglass were for their alleged “refusal to obey a court directive to
cease argument.”151 The court of appeals found
that the trial judge, when ordering counsel to terminate their argument
or sit down, frequently added a rejoinder or coupled the order with a
statement which called for a response by the attorneys. In such
situations, it is our view that an invited, additional response cannot
subsequently be viewed as a contemptuous violation of the order.152

The flip side of this lesson is that when there is a direct order to cease
an argument, and the argument has been sufficiently stated, a lawyer
should stop arguing the issue. In discussing how long a lawyer may
persist in an argument, the court of appeals cautioned that lawyers may
not “press their positions beyond the court’s insistent direction to
desist.”153
3. Lesson Three: Disobeying an Ambiguous Court Order Is Not
Contempt
Judge Hoffman found Kunstler in contempt for making a motion to
have Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley, whom the defense had called as a
witness, declared a hostile witness in the presence of the jury after
Kunstler had asked Daley several questions.154 Judge Hoffman had
previously issued an order that any motion to declare Daley a hostile
witness should be made outside of the jury’s presence, and the contempt
citation stated that Kunstler had violated the court’s order.155
Kunstler testified that he thought the order only prohibited him from
arguing the motion to declare Daley a hostile witness in the presence of
the jury, and Judge Gignoux found that Judge Hoffman’s order was
“somewhat ambiguous.”156 Judge Gignoux observed that once the
150. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
151. In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 399 (7th Cir. 1972).
152. Id.
153. Id. The court of appeals also stated that a judge should “exercise tolerance in determining
those limits and to distinguish carefully between hesitating, begrudging obedience and open
defiance.” Id.
154. In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1317 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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prosecutor called Judge Hoffman’s attention to the alleged violation of
the court’s order, Kunstler made several requests to have the jury
excused, and Judge Hoffman denied those requests.157 Judge Gignoux
also found that Kunstler’s “motion could not conceivably have prejudiced
the jury, inasmuch as the hostility existing between Mayor Daley and the
defendants was obvious to everyone in the courtroom.”158
4. Lesson Four: Disrespect or Insult Alone Is Not Contempt
In dismissing some of Judge Hoffman’s contempt citations, the court
of appeals stated that “mere disrespect or insult cannot be punished where
it does not involve an actual and material obstruction. This is particularly
true with respect to attorneys where the ‘heat of courtroom debate’ may
prompt statements which are ill-considered and might later be
regretted.”159 Thus, disrespect or insult of a judge may be contempt only
when there is some obstruction of the court proceeding. The court of
appeals explained that this occurs when the lawyer’s “remarks create an
imminent prejudice to a fair and dispassionate proceeding.”160
Whether there is contempt when a lawyer insults or otherwise shows
disrespect for a judge may turn on how a remark or comment is made.
For example, shouting an insult or disrespectful remark may trigger an
obstruction of the judicial process where the insult or disrespectful
remark alone would not.161 Also, an insult or disrespectful remark that
leads to a delay in the proceedings will likely be grounds for finding
contempt.162
To illustrate when insult and disrespect becomes contempt, it is helpful
to look at some comments that Weinglass made, which the court of
appeals found did not constitute contempt. These comments are then
contrasted with some comments that Kunstler made, which the court of
appeals remanded for trial on a contempt citation, and which Judge
Gignoux found to be contempt.
Judge Hoffman made an evidentiary ruling that Weinglass’s
examination of a witness had opened the door to permit the government
to elicit testimony that was harmful to the defense.163 Judge Hoffman
found Weinglass in contempt for these comments, stating that the court
believed the comments indicated Weinglass’s “belief that the court had
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Id.
In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389, 400 (7th Cir. 1972).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 457 (Weinglass, contempt citation III).
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been prejudicial in its rulings on evidence.”164 The contempt citation
contains the following exchange from the trial transcript:
The Court: What do the lawyers say about that, they open the door? Is
that what you lawyers all say?
Mr. Weinglass: We do not open the door to a prejudicial question. I very
carefully avoided any mention of any section of a code.
The Court: That is the reason for the open-the-door rule.
Mr. Weinglass: Well, the door has been—
The Court: Very often it kicks back in your face.
Mr. Weinglass: The door in this courtroom seems to swing in one
direction. Many times I have attempted to—
The Court: Miss Reporter, please make note of that. The court
admonishes counsel to be cautious in his observations, in the
observations he makes such as he just completed.165

Judge Hoffman had originally sentenced Weinglass to fourteen days in
jail for these comments.166 The court of appeals found that the contempt
citation based on these comments was insufficient as a matter of law, and
did not remand the citation for trial before Judge Gignoux. 167 It is clear
that although Judge Hoffman apparently felt insulted by Weinglass,
indicating his belief that the judge was prejudiced against the defense, the
comments did not obstruct the proceedings.
As part of two other contempt citations that the court of appeals
remanded for trial, Weinglass implied that Judge Hoffman had been
dishonest in an evidentiary ruling in one contempt citation,168 and that
Judge Hoffman’s ruling preventing Kunstler from arguing for the release
of one of the defendants who was in custody was “disgraceful” in another
citation.169 Judge Gignoux did not find that either of these comments or
Weinglass’s continuing to argue after the Judge had ordered him to cease
argument constituted contempt.170
In contrast, some of the insults and disrespectful comments Kunstler
directed to Judge Hoffman did constitute contempt. These comments
were in one of the contempt citations against Kunstler and involved
Kunstler’s reaction to Judge Hoffman’s denial to a defense request to call
a witness. Kunstler
termed the judge’s ruling “about the most outrageous statement I have
ever heard from a bench,” violating “every principle of fair play;” stated

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 400.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 465.
In re Dellinger, 370 F. Supp. 1304, 1319, 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
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that he felt “disgraced to be here” and that the judge could hold him in
contempt if he wished to do so; accused the judge of extreme bias;
documented his accusations with a quotation from The New York Times
which had characterized a prior ruling of the judge as “the ultimate
outrage in American justice”; called the trial “a legal lynching”; and
concluded with the following observation:
—and that, your Honor, is wholly responsible for that, and if this is
what your career is going to end on, if this is what your pride is
going to be built on, I can only say to your Honor, “Good luck to
you.”
Shouts of “Right on” and applause followed.171

Considering these remarks by Kunstler and the reaction in the
courtroom they caused, Judge Gignoux found that they constituted
contempt, and he explained:
Mr. Kunstler testified that his remarks constituted “forceful and
vigorous” argument. However, the extent and violence of the diatribe
and the bitterness and anger expressed demonstrate that his comments
constituted a vicious personal attack on the judge which could only have
served to vent his spleen. His remarks plainly created an “imminent
prejudice to a fair and dispassionate proceeding.” Unquestionably, the
line “beyond which disrespect becomes obstruction” was crossed. . . .
Mr. Kunstler knew his conduct was wrongful; and that the conduct,
which resulted in an entirely unnecessary and not insignificant delay
and disruption of the proceedings, exceeded the “outermost limits” of
advocacy and rose to the level of an actual and material obstruction of
the administration of justice.172

Because an insult or disrespectful remark usually serves no other
purpose but to provide some satisfaction to the person making the remark,
the more prudent course of action is for a lawyer to refrain from making
such comments even if the comments may not rise to the level of
contempt. Especially in trial, a defense lawyer not only has to worry about
a judge’s reaction but also the reaction of the jury. Before insulting a
judge, a defense lawyer should ask, “Is this going to help my client?”
Much more often than not, the likely answer is “no.” On the other hand,
in some extreme situations such as the Chicago Eight Trial, voicing wellfounded beliefs about the judge’s rulings that do not interfere with the
proceedings may call attention to how unjust the proceedings are.
5. Lesson Five: An Attorney Does Not Have an Obligation to Restrain
Others from Disruptive Conduct
Judge Hoffman cited Kunstler for contempt for “failing to assist the
171. Id. at 1319.
172. Id. at 1319–20 (citations omitted).
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court in maintaining order” when Seale was bound and gagged.173 The
court of appeals looked unfavorably upon this type of contempt charge,
and stated that “[a]n attorney has no affirmative obligation to restrain his
client under pain of the contempt sanction.”174 The court of appeals
recognized that such an expectation would intrude on and undermine the
client’s “confidence in the attorney-client relationship which is necessary
to a proper and adequate defense.”175 On the other hand, the court of
appeals cautioned that a lawyer may not encourage a client to engage in
disruptive behavior.176 The court of appeals remanded the citation for
trial to determine if Kunstler contributed in some way to the disruption in
the courtroom when Seale was bound and gagged.
In evaluating Kunstler’s behavior, Judge Gignoux found that
Kunstler’s refusal to assist Judge Hoffman in maintaining order when
Seale was bound and gagged was not contempt.177 Judge Gignoux’s
review of the record also did not support a finding that Kunstler’s
comments encouraged or caused disorder.178
Thus, a defense lawyer does not have to obey a judge’s order to stop a
client from engaging in disruptive behavior. Of course, there usually will
be strategic reasons, even without a judge’s order, for a defense lawyer
to ask a client to refrain from disrupting a proceeding. In my experience,
jury members hold disruptive behavior against the defendant in a criminal
case. In contrast, when one is defending a client in a patently unfair trial,
such as the Chicago Eight Trial, Bobby Seale’s disruption in the
courtroom called attention to the unfairness of the trial and ultimately led
to the dismissal of the underlying criminal and contempt charges.
CONCLUSION
My interest in contempt and the Chicago Eight Trial stems from
hearing Leonard Weinglass give a lecture while I was a law student. He
talked about the Chicago Eight Trial and how to advocate for a client
zealously without being held in contempt of court. He told us that at times
some judges would try to interfere with our clients’ rights and our ability
to advocate for our clients. Weinglass told us that in addressing the court
and pressing a point, it was important to preface when we said with “Your
honor,” or “May it please the court,” and, when you disagreed with the
judge, say “With all due respect.” He said that once those words or similar
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
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words were spoken, we could make the arguments we thought most
effective and necessary for our clients.
Weinglass’s advice is sound. It worked for him, as the ultimate
dismissal of all fourteen contempt citations against him in the Chicago
Eight Trial demonstrates. Even if he “approached the brink, he did not
cross the line between advocacy and obstruction.”179 Weinglass’s advice
also worked for me. Though a few judges threatened me with contempt
from time to time as I pressed a point or tried to make a record for appeal,
I never had to go through the contempt process.
The lessons from the Chicago Eight Trial on the limits of a judge’s
contempt power and the limits of advocacy confirm Weinglass’s advice
on the subject and provide additional guidance. I hope no one reading this
Article has to face contempt charges, and, if they do, the court will agree
that they did not cross the line.

179. Id. at 1319; see supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.

